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Abstract. We propose a simple quantum-key-distribution (QKD) scheme for
practical single photon sources (SPSs), which works even with a moderate suppression
of the second-order correlation g(2) of the source. The scheme utilizes a passive
preparation of a decoy state by monitoring a fraction of the signal via an additional
beam splitter and a detector at the sender’s side to monitor photon number splitting
attacks. We show that the achievable distance increases with the precision with which
the sub-Poissonian tendency is confirmed in higher photon number distribution of the
source, rather than with actual suppression of the multi-photon emission events. We
present an example of the secure key generation rate in the case of a poor SPS with
g(2) = 0.19, in which no secure key is produced with the conventional QKD scheme, and
show that learning the photon-number distribution up to several numbers is sufficient
for achieving almost the same achievable distance as that of an ideal SPS.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
A single-photon source (SPS), which emits exactly one photon in a well defined
optical mode, has been actively studied with quantum dots [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11],
colour centres in diamond [12, 13, 14, 15], and other systems [16, 17, 18, 19]. Behind
those activities lies the fact that ideal SPSs serve as a useful resource for efficient
quantum information processing such as quantum computation [20] and quantum key
distribution (QKD) [21]. But imperfections in practical SPSs affect the performance in
those applications, especially in QKD [22, 23, 24] in which very rare emission events
could be exploited by a potential eavesdropper Eve. The imperfection that matters
most in QKD is the emission of multiple (two or more) photons in a single pulse, which
we assume to occur with probability pmulti. Usually the two-photon events are dominant
in pmulti, in which case it is related to the normalised second-order correlation g
(2) by
pmulti = µ
2g(2)/2 with µ being the average photon number emitted in a pulse. Since
µ ∼ O(1) in practical SPSs, pmulti and g
(2) are of the same order of magnitude. In the
BB84 QKD protocol, which has been proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [21],
whenever the sender Alice emits multiple photons Eve can steal a photon to obtain full
information without introducing any error. To make matters worse, we cannot exclude
the possibility that Eve may force the receiver Bob to detect a photon preferentially in
such a multi-photon emission event. As a result of this photon-number splitting (PNS)
attack, the protocol produces no secret key beyond a threshold distance at which Bob’s
detection rate Q is comparable to pmulti [25]. Unless we accept a significant reduction of
the emission probability µ [26], it poses a severe requirement on g(2). For example, for
an optical channel with a loss of 0.2 dB/km of the typical telecommunication fibre and
for Bob’s detection apparatus with efficiency 0.01, it is estimated under µ ∼ O(1) that
g(2) ∼ O(10−6) is needed to reach a communication distance of 200 km. This requisite
will be hard to achieve in real experiments, and if at all, it may require sacrificing other
performances such as the repetition rate.
In order to circumvent this problem, one may depart from the BB84 protocol
to adopt a different sifting procedure [27] yielding a key even from the multi-photon
emission events [28, 29]. Another common direction is to keep the protocol itself and to
devise a way to obtain a clue about photon number dependence of Eve’s attack. Our
main idea in this paper is to use the correlation between the two output lights from a
beam splitter to obtain such a clue [30, 31]. For the BB84 protocol with polarization
encoding, this idea is implemented by inserting a non-polarizing beam splitter with a
transmittance T and placing a monitoring detector DM at Alice’s side as in Fig. 1 (a).
For a standard phase-encoding system based on a double Mach-Zehnder interferometer
(DMZI), mere addition of DM at the open port implements our scheme with T = 1/2,
as shown in Fig. 1 (b). If the light incident on DM is suitably correlated to the number
of photons sent toward Bob, we may detect Eve’s PNS attacks like the decoy-state idea
[32, 33, 34] and particularly passive decoy-state generation schemes [35, 36, 37].
In order for the above strategy to work, knowledge of emission statistics for higher
photon numbers is essential. As we will show, our scheme can detect the PNS attacks
when the higher photon number tail drops more steeply than a Poissonian distribution,
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Figure 1. a, Polarization-encoding BB84 QKD protocol with the proposed
modification. The only difference from the conventional system is the addition of
a non-polarizing beam splitter to measure a fraction R = 1 − T of the signal with a
monitoring detector DM at Alice’s side. b, Phase-encoding BB84 QKD protocol based
on a DMZI with the proposed modification. Alice uses two 50/50 fibre couplers and
a phase modulator, and encodes bit information on the relative phase between two
pulses. Bob uses the same setup as Alice’s followed by two threshold detectors (DB’s).
The only difference from the conventional setup is just the use of a monitoring detector
DM at Alice’s side.
as explained in Fig. 2. If this sub-Poissonian tendency continues to arbitrary large
photon numbers, Eve can no longer force Bob to detect a photon preferentially in a
multi-photon emission event. In practice, the characterization of the emission statistics
is not complete and will be left with an uncharacterized portion ∆. In the simplest
case where Bob detects photons at rate Q with no errors, the key rate G in our scheme
is approximated as G = Q − (∆/C), which should be compared with the rate in the
conventional scheme G = Q − pmulti [25]. Here C is a constant reflecting the degree of
the sub-Poissonian tendency. Since Q scales as 10−αl/10 with distance l, the threshold
distance at which G = 0 in our scheme scales as (− log10∆) − (− log10C) + const.,
whereas it is (− log10 pmulti) + const. in the conventional scheme. Therefore, without
actually suppressing multi-photon emission pmulti by a factor, we obtain the same
improvement merely by reducing the ambiguity ∆ in learning the statistics by the same
factor.
From now on, we focus on the case where DM is a threshold detector with dark
count rate dM and efficiency ηM . The outcome of this detector is binary: When n
photons are incident, it produces a click with probability 1 − (1 − dM)(1 − ηM)
n, and
otherwise gives no click. We classify the events to clicked events and non-clicked ones,
according to the outcome of DM .
For the security analysis, it is convenient to describe the correlation between the
two outputs of Alice’s beam splitter through a set of parameters {γn}, defined to be
the conditional probability of DM to produce a click, given that n photons are sent
toward Bob. With (ηM , dM , T ) fixed, {γn} depend solely on the density operator ρ of
the source, which we assume to take the form of ρ =
∑∞
n=0 pn|n〉〈n|. Let us define a
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Figure 2. Our scheme works when the photon number distribution p˜n of the source
has a “sub-Poissonian tail,” which has a simple meaning in the usual cases with
p˜1 ≫ p˜2 ≫ · · ·. In the figure, the distribution is shown as blue bars in logarithmic
scale, together with square dots corresponding to a Poissonian distribution {Pn}
satisfying p˜2/p˜1 = P2/P1. The decrements are denoted by an ≡ log10(p˜n/p˜n+1) and
bn ≡ log10(Pn/Pn+1). When the tail of the distribution vanishes more rapidly than
the Poissonian distribution, namely, when an − bn ≥ r for all n ≥ 2 with a positive
constant r > 0, our simple scheme can foil the PNS attacks and the multi-photon
emission becomes no concern (pmulti is effectively zero). When an−bn ≥ r is confirmed
only up to n = nmax − 1 with the residual uncharacterized portion ∆ ∼= p˜nmax+1,
the detection of the PNS attacks becomes imperfect but our scheme still achieves
performance comparable to the use of a source with pmulti = ∆/C, with C being a
constant proportional to 1− 10−r (shown as red bars for nmax = 5).
characteristic function κρ(t) of the source by
κρ(t) ≡ Tr[ρt
nˆ] =
∞∑
n=0
pnt
n, (1)
where nˆ ≡
∑∞
n=0 n|n〉〈n|. Then the conditional probability γn(ρ) is conveniently
represented using its n-th derivative κ
(n)
ρ (t) ≡ dnκρ(t)/dt
n as
γn(ρ) = 1− [(1− dM)κ
(n)
ρ (R(1− ηM))/κ
(n)
ρ (R)], (2)
where R = 1−T . When {pn} is Poissonian with mean µ, it follows that κρ(t) = e
−µ(1−t)
and hence γn(ρ) is independent of n. For dM ≪ 1 and p1 ≫ p2 ≫ p3 ≫ · · ·, the
parameters γn(ρ)(n ≥ 1) are approximated by
γn(ρ) ∼ RηM (n+ 1)pn+1/pn. (3)
Hence, roughly speaking, the values of {γn(ρ)} represent how slowly the tail of the
photon number distribution vanishes. For example, if γ1(ρ) > γn(ρ) holds for all n ≥ 2,
the tail of the distribution vanishes more rapidly compared to the Poissonian distribution
with the same ratio p2/p1. In this paper, we say such a distribution has a “sub-Poissonian
tail.”
In fact, a source with a sub-Poissonian tail is ideal for our present scheme to work.
Let
Q = Q[c] +Q[nc] (4)
be the overall rate of detection by Bob, where the superscript c stands for the clicked
events, and nc for the non-clicked events. These quantities are actually observed in the
protocol. On the other hand, Q is also decomposed as Q =
∑
nQn, where Qn stands for
the portion in which Alice has sent out n photons toward Bob (we call it “n-photon”
events henceforth). Since DM clicks with probability γn(ρ) in the n-photon events, we
should have Q[c] =
∑
n γn(ρ)Qn in the asymptotic limit of a large number of pulses.
Then, if Eve substitutes 1-photon events by n-photon events with n ≥ 2, Q[c] decreases
due to the condition γ1(ρ) > γn(ρ) (n ≥ 2) and the attack will be detected. She may try
to increase 0-photon events to compensate the decrease in Q[c], but it will then increase
the observed error rate, since if Alice emits no photon, the probability of bit errors is
1/2. Therefore, a source strictly satisfying γ1(ρ) > γn(ρ) (n ≥ 2) allows us to detect
PNS attacks in a very simple way.
In practice, it may be hard to find such a source, and it is even harder to prove
it by characterizing the photon-number distribution of the source. For this reason,
here we relax the condition and consider an approximate version of a source with a
sub-Poissonian tail as follows.
Assumption on the source — The density operator ρsrc of a pulse from the source
is written as a mixture of two normalised density operators as
ρsrc = (1−∆)ρsp +∆ρuk, (5)
where 0 ≤ ∆ < 1. With an integer nmax, which may be infinity, ρsp is written in the
form ρsp =
∑nmax
n=0 pn|n〉〈n|. There exists Γ satisfying
γ1(ρsp) > Γ ≥ γn(ρsp) (6)
for 2 ≤ n ≤ nmax.
Under this assumption, the source emits an arbitrary unknown pulse with a (small)
probability ∆, but otherwise the distribution has a sub-Poissonian tail, whose degree
is measured by parameter Γ. We expect that a source will satisfy this assumption in
the following scenario, for example. A pseudo-single-photon source with distribution
{p˜n} is given, and a sequence of characterization experiments tells us good estimates of
probabilities p˜0, p˜1, . . . , p˜nmax. Then we choose ∆ =
∑∞
n=nmax+1
p˜n and pn = p˜n/(1 −∆)
for n ≤ nmax. After calculating the values of {γn(ρsp)} from p0, p1, . . . , pnmax, we take
Γ = max{γn(ρsp)|2 ≤ n ≤ nmax} and see if γ1(ρsp) > Γ holds. In this example, ρuk
stands for the uncharacterized portion of the source. We may also use ρuk to absorb the
higher photon-number part responsible for an unwanted relation γ1(ρsp) < γn(ρsp).
For a source with ∆ > 0, Eve may be able to increase Q[c] by letting Bob preferably
detect the events from ρuk. But the amount of the increase is obviously no larger than
∆. This increase leaves Eve a room for substituting 1-photon events with multi-photon
events with rate up to ∆/(γ1(ρsp) − Γ), but no more. Hence, as long as the overall
detection rate is higher than this rate, one may still expect to generate a secret key. In
Appendix, we confirm this in a rigorous analysis.
Before we give a numerical example showing the improvement in the secure key rate,
we discuss the ideal case where Bob has observed no bit errors. In this case, the secure
key rate is given by [Q[c] − ΓQ − ∆(1 − Γ)]/(γ1(ρsp) − Γ) (see Appendix). Since Alice
uses a pseudo-single-photon source, the single-photon contribution should be dominant
in Bob’s detection events, namely, Q[c]/Q ≃ γ1(ρsp). Using the fact Γ≪ 1, the key rate
is then simplified as Q−∆/(γ1(ρsp)−Γ), confirming the dependence which we promised
in the introductory part with C = γ1(ρsp)− Γ. This means that the key rate is positive
as long as Q > ∆/(γ1(ρsp) − Γ), implying that the uncharacterized portion ∆ mainly
determines the threshold distance at which the key rate vanishes.
We further show that the tendency in the ideal cases discussed above is also
qualitatively valid with realistic channels and detectors, for an example of pseudo-
single-photon source which is modelled as an ideal SPS with a loss and Poissonian
background. In Fig. 3, we have chosen a source with a rather high multi-photon
emission rate of 0.086 (g(2) = 0.19), which cannot generate secret key at any distance
in the conventional scheme. Figure 3 shows the key rates for the same source with
varied levels of characterization. For this source with pn+1/pn ∼ 10
−1.7, increasing the
maximum photon number nmax by one reduces ∆ by factor of 10
1.7. The analysis for the
ideal case above suggests that this will increase the threshold distance by 17 dB/(0.2
dB/km) = 85 km, which agrees with the curves in Fig. 3 for shorter distances where
the error rate is not so high.
Throughout this paper, we only considered the limit of a large number of repetitions
and a large final key, in which errors in estimating parameters due to statistical
fluctuations are negligible. In practice, the key has a finite size and we must take the
statistical fluctuations into account. This is beyond the scope of this paper but a few
remarks are in order. Although our scheme may appear to involve a lot of parameters,
it requires only a few of them to be estimated while actually running the protocol, due
to its simplicity. The rest of the parameters, namely, the photon-number statistics of
Alice’s source, can be characterized off-line, before running the actual protocol. Of
course, a care must be taken in this characterization to allow for practical issues such
as the stability of the source.
Finally, we discuss the opposite condition of Eq. (6), γ1(ρsp) < Υ ≤ γn(ρsp) for
2 ≤ n ≤ nmax. This means a “super-Poissonian tail,” namely, a tendency that if
multiple photons appear at one of the two outputs of the beam splitter, then the other
one has a larger probability of having photons. For example, the heralded parametric
down-conversion (PDC) source shows this tendency, which is ascribed to the thermal
photon-number distribution observed in the signal mode of PDC. In this case, γ1(ρsp)
is the minimum of {γn(ρsp)} and any attempt by Eve to block 1-photon events should
show up as an increase in the observed value of Q[c]. Therefore we can also obtain secure
key by using a similar analysis. We found that the rule of thumb for the key rate in this
case is again given by G = Q−∆/C, with C = 1− γ1(ρsp)/Υ.
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Figure 3. Alice’s source ρsrc is chosen to be a mixture of a single-photon source with
a loss and Poissonian background. The distribution is given by p˜0 = p
(sp)
0 P
(Poi)
0 and
p˜n = p
(sp)
0 P
(Poi)
n + p
(sp)
1 P
(Poi)
n−1 for n ≥ 1, with P
(Poi)
n ≡ e−ννn/n!. We set p
(sp)
0 = 0.1,
p
(sp)
1 = 0.9, and ν = 0.1, which leads to pmulti = 0.086 and g
(2) = 0.19. (Its distribution
is plotted as the blue bars in Fig. 2.) The residual parameters are chosen as follows:
ηM = 0.15; dM = 10
−6; the error correction efficiency, f = 1.2; loss coefficient of
channel, 0.2 [dB/km]; error rate of channel, 0.03 (independent of distance). Each
of Bob’s detectors has the same dark count rate 2.5 × 10−9 and efficiency 0.01 [41].
a, nmax = 4, b, nmax = 5, c, nmax = 6, d, nmax = 7, e, ∆ = 0. We see that
increasing nmax leads to a constant improvement of the threshold distance, until the
overall detection rate drops to the order of Bob’s dark count rate. Dashed curve shows
the rate in a standard phase-encoding system (without DM ) based on a DMZI with
an ideal SPS.
In conclusion, we have proposed a simple scheme to detect eavesdropping attacks
on multi-photon emissions from practical single-photon sources. In contrast to the
conventional scheme in which actual suppression of multi-photon emissions is neces-
sary to avoid such attacks, our scheme requires no suppression as long as the higher
photon-number tail of emission probabilities decreases more rapidly than a Poissonian
distribution. As an example, we calculated the key rate for a lossy single-photon source
suffering from Poissonian background noise, which is regarded as a bad source in terms
of g(2). We found that reducing the ambiguity in the characterization of the source
improves the key rate, in much the same way as the actual suppression of g(2) does in
the conventional scheme. It is worth mentioning here that the requisite in our scheme
is satisfied by SPSs following a wide range of simple theoretical models: Any source
with imperfection modelled by loss and Poissonian background satisfies the requisite of
sub-Poissonian tail, regardless of the amount of the loss and the background. On the
other hand, if the background noise follows a thermal distribution, the source always
has a super-Poissonian tail, which also meets our alternative condition discussed above.
This also opens up a possibility that we may intentionally increase the fluctuations in
the background to meet the requisite. Naturally, our result provides a new perspective
on the desired performance of a practical single-photon source, namely, property of pho-
ton number correlations of orders higher than g(2). Recent development in the streak
cameras [42] and photon-number-resolving detectors [43, 44, 45] are helpful in studying
such higher-order correlations. Therefore it will be interesting to experimentally char-
acterize them for the single-photon sources currently under development, as well as to
seek plausible theoretical models of high photon-number emissions.
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Appendix
Since one can simulate the source ρsrc equivalently by actively switching between the
sources ρsp and ρuk, we are allowed to label each detection event according to which
of the source was used. As a result, the overall detection rate Q is decomposed as
Q = χ+Quk, where χ (used instead of Qsp for simplifying the notations) is the fraction
with the source ρsp, and Quk is with ρuk. Using similar decomposition for Qn, we have
Q = χ0 + χ1 + χ≥2 +Quk, (A.1)
where χ≥2 ≡
∑nmax
n=2 χn. The clicked and non-clicked portions are also written as
(j = c, nc)
Q[j] = χ
[j]
0 + χ
[j]
1 + χ
[j]
≥2 +Q
[j]
uk. (A.2)
Since χ
[c]
n = γn(ρsp)χn and Q
[c]
uk ≤ Quk, we use Eq. (6) to have
Q[c] ≤ γ0(ρsp)χ0 + γ1(ρsp)χ1 + Γχ≥2 +Quk. (A.3)
Eliminating χ≥2 using Eq. (A.1) and noting that Quk ≤ ∆, we obtain a bound on χ1 as
χ1 ≥ ξ(χ0) ≡ (γ1(ρsp)− Γ)
−1
× [Q[c] − ΓQ− (1− Γ)∆− (γ0(ρsp)− Γ)χ0]. (A.4)
Next, we derive an upper bound on the error rate e1 for the 1-photon events.
Let E[c] and E[nc] be the overall error rates for the clicked events and the non-clicked
events, respectively, which can be directly estimated in the protocol. Considering the
contribution from 0- and 1-photon events, we have, for j = c, nc,
Q[j]E[j] ≥ χ
[j]
0 /2 + χ
[j]
1 e1. (A.5)
Combining with χ
[c]
n = χn − χ
[nc]
n , we obtain e1 ≤ ǫ(χ0) with
ǫ(χ0) ≡ min {(Q
[c]E[c] − γ0χ0/2)/[γ1ξ(χ0)],
[Q[nc]E[nc] − (1− γ0)χ0/2]/[(1− γ1)ξ(χ0)]}, (A.6)
where γn = γn(ρsp). The allowed range of the parameter χ0 is determined from the
condition ǫ(χ0) ≥ 0.
The secure key generation rate for the clicked events or the non-clicked events is
given by the so-called GLLP formula [38, 39, 40] as
G[j]/q = −Q[j]fH2(E
[j]) +Q
[j]
0 +Q
[j]
1 [1−H2(e1)] (A.7)
(j = c, nc), where q denotes the protocol efficiency (e.g. q = 1/2 in the standard
BB84 protocol because half of the events are discarded by basis mismatch), f ≥ 1 the
error correction efficiency, and H2(x) ≡ −log2x− (1− x)log2(1− x) the binary entropy
function. Noting that Q
[j]
n ≥ χ
[j]
n and assuming the worst case for the choice of unknown
parameter χ0, we have an expression for achievable key rates as
G[c]/q = −Q[c]fH2(E
[c])
+ min
χ0
{γ0χ0 + γ1ξ(χ0)[1−H2(ǫ(χ0))]},
G[nc]/q = −Q[nc]fH2(E
[nc]) + min
χ0
{(1− γ0)χ0
+ (1− γ1)ξ(χ0)[1−H2(ǫ(χ0))]}, (A.8)
where γn = γn(ρsp).
When the secure key can be obtained from both events, we can achieve a key
rate better than G[c] + G[nc] by doing the error correction separately but the privacy
amplification jointly. The achievable rate in this case is given by
G[both]/q = −Q[c]fH2(E
[c])−Q[nc]fH2(E
[nc])
+ min
χ0
{χ0 + ξ(χ0)[1−H2(ǫ(χ0))]}. (A.9)
Thus, the final key rate is given by G = max{G[both], G[c], G[nc]}. In the ideal case where
Bob has no bit errors (E[c] = E[nc] = 0), we have χ0 = 0 and the final key rate is given
by G/q = ξ(0) = [Q[c] − ΓQ−∆(1− Γ)]/(γ1(ρsp)− Γ).
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